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UNEXPIRED LEASES IN BANKRUPTCY: 
RIGHTS OF THE AFFECTED MORTGAGEE 
PETER A. ALCES;:. 
State law permits a foreclosing mortgagee to evict a subsequent lessee of 
the mortgagor provided the lessee is joined in the foreclosure proceeding.1 A 
mortgagee's rights are less defined, however, when the mortgagor becomes a 
"debtor"2 under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code). Although several 
Code provisions touch upon the matter, they do not clearly balance the 
equities.3 
Professor Krasnowiecki analyzed this disparate treatment in an article 
published shortly after the Code's enactment4 and concluded: 
If there are leases in [a mortgagedl building that are depressing the value 
of the building and the landlord goes through a straight bankruptcy/ 
0 Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; A.B. 1977, Lafayette College; 
J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the very thorough re· 
search and editorial assistance provided by Sarah E. Woelk, J.D. 1983, University of Texas. 
I. See generally G. OsBORNE, G. NELSON & D. 'VHinrAN, REAL EsrATE FINANCE L.\W 
§ 7.12, 451-52 (1980). Absent an agreement between the lessee and the mortgagee as to 
priority, the lessee's rights in a foreclosure proceeding are determined by the timing of the 
lease in relation to the mortgage. If the lease preceded the mortgage, the purchaser takes 
the property encumbered by the lease. If the mortgage preceded the lease, however, the lease 
is generally extinguished. Wilson v. Campbell, 244 Ark. 451, 425 S.W.2d 518 (1968); Kansas 
City Mortgage Co. v. Industrial Comro'n, 555 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); 127 Korea 
House, Inc. v. House of Korea, 49 A.D.2d 736, 372 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1975). 
The rules governing a foreclosing mortgagee's right to bind a subsequent Jessee to his 
lease vary. Compare Kansas City Mortgage Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 555 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1977) (not possible for a mortgagee to become a substitute landlord on leases pre-
viously executed by the mortgagor) with Silverstein v. Schak, 107 Ill. App. 3d 641, 437 N.E.2d 
1292 (1982) (foreclosing mortgagee may either evict the mortgagor's lessee or recognize the 
lessee as his tenant under the <:xisting lease). See generally Comment, The Effect of a 
Mortgage Foreclosure on a Lease Executed Subsequent to the Mortgage, 17 WASH. L. REv. 
37 (1942) (describing the rights of foreclosing mortgagees and lessees by reference to the law 
of several states). 
2. A debtor under the Code is a "person or municipality concerning which a case under 
this title has been commenced." II U.S.C. § 101(12) (Supp. V 1981). Collier explained that 
the Code uses the term "debtor" throughout to avoid the stigma attached to the term 
"bankrupt." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 101.12 (15th ed. 1979), citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977), 1·eprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & Ao. NEws 5963; S. REP. 
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CooE CoNG. & An. NEws 5963. 
3. In the analogous situation of the lessee's bankmptcy, the Code is more specific. The 
Code precludes operation of "ipso facto" or bankruptcy clauses that would effectively divest 
the interest of a debtor upon the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. II U.S.C. § 365 
(Supp. V 1981). The Code also sets out a landlord's claim for future rent against a bankrupt 
lessee by limiting the claim to the t~reater of one year's rent payments or 15% of the payments 
for the balance of the lease term, not in excess of three years. ld. § 502(b)(7). 
4. Krasnowiecki, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Reform Act on Real Estate De-
velopment and Financing, 53 AM. l~ANKR. L.J. 363 (1979). 
5. The Code uses the term "liquidation" rather than "straight bankruptcy." The pro-
visions on liquidation are in chapter 7 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. V 1981). 
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the landlord's mortgagee will ordinarily be able to lift the stay6 if its 
claim exceeds the value of the building7 and, in any event, if the build-
ing is sold it "\\Till be sold subject to the mortgage. In a reorganization ... , 
however, the stay may not be lifted,8 and if the trustee has no power to 
modify the rent, the landlord's mortgagee may be injured, because it 
may be required in a "cram down"9 to accept cash or extended payments 
equal to the present value of the building (as depressed by the outstand-
ing leases).10 
65'1 
Insofar as bankruptcy courts are courts of equity11 designed to balance com-
peting interests,12 Professor Krasnowiecki's conclusion would frustrate the 
essential purpose of the bankruptcy system. 
Tlris article will consider the arguments available to the mortgagee whose 
collateral is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and encumbered by below-
market leases.l3 The thesis advocated is that the correct reading of the Code 
protects the affected mortgagee by permitting dispossession of the mortgagor-
debtor's tenant. This article describes the mortgagee's arguments and supports 
those assertions by examining the dynamics of reorganization in bankruptcy.14 
THE PRIOR LAW 
The best indication of the drafters' intent in balancing equities under the 
Code may be the common understanding of the parties' rights under prior law. 
6. Id. § 362 See infra note 59. 
7. "Since, ex hypotesi, the building is not 'necessary to an effective reorganization.'" 
Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 375 n.60. 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) {Supp. V 1981). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 113-121. 
10. There was considerable controversy under the "strong arm" proVISlOn of the 
Bankruptcy Act, § 70(e)(1), whether the trustee could assert the rights of any se-
cured creditor to void any other claim. Kennery, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a 
Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1419 (1967). 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act expressly states that the trustee may assert only the 
rights of an unsecured creditor, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). Although the leases are not 
"claims," it seems clear, by analogy, that the trustee cannot simply terminate the 
leases merely because the mortgagee would h~ve this power. 
Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 375 n.63. See also infra text accompanying notes 96-108. 
ll. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); In re Flour Mills of Am., 27 F. Supp. 559, 
560 (W .D. Mo. 1939). 
12. "Congressional objective in enacting [the Bankruptcy Act] was to secure for creditors 
as well as bankrupts the efficient and fair administration of estates." In re Palfy, 336 F. Supp. 
1268, 1269 (N.D. Ohio 1972). 
13. A mortgagee may become party to a bankruptcy proceeding with little or no notice. 
The Code does not require a debtor to be insolvent to take advantage of the relief offered by 
the Reform Act. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301, 303 (Supp. V 1981) (describing the requisites for 
initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding). 
14. The rights of a similarly situated mortgagee in a liquidation proceeding are not 
examined in this article except incidentally for purposes of comparison. The arguments 
framed are best understood if the formulation of a plan of reorganization is viewed as a 
negotiation process. That is, it might not be crucial for a bankruptcy judge to be convinced 
of the impregnability of the mortgagee's position. It could be sufficient that the debtor's 
representative understands that the judge may be persuaded to see things as does the 
mortgagee. 
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Specifically, how did Chandler Actl5 and pre-Chandler Actl6 principles ac-
commodate the interests considered here? In formulating arguments that pro-
tect the mortgagee's interests under the Code, it is helpful to consider the 
options available to the mortgagee prior to the Reform Act. 
Pre-Chandler Act 
In a thorough commentary,17 Professors Creedon and Zinman interpreted 
the pre-Chandler Act law as permitting the landlord's trustee to reject an un-
expired lease yet precluding the trustee from evicting the tenant in mid-lease 
or increasing the rent.18 According to Professors Creedon and Zinman, "[t]he 
statutes, case law and commentaries seemed to assume sub silencio that a re-
jection of the lease by a trustee of a landlord in bankruptcy or receivership 
could not terminate the tenant's interest in the property or force the tenant to 
vacate the premises."1D 
Creedon and Zinman cited four cases20 in support of that conclusion.21 
Three of those cases contended in dicta that the landlord's trustee could not 
dispossess the tenant.22 None of the four cases, however, is unassailable 
authority for that proposition because a trustee's right to dispossess a tenant 
was not in issue. Furthermore, none of the cases involved a prior mortgagee.23 
The language in two of the cases illustrates that the pre-Chandler Act law was 
not as unflinchingly pro-lessee as Creedon and Zinman implied.24 
15. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1979). The Chandler Act, a 
complete revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, was enacted in response to criticism that 
prevailing law was "not adapted to existing conditions because of its slow-moving pro-
cedural machinery, a breakdown of creditor control, a large number of administrative duties 
thrust upon the courts, and the domination of administration by attorneys." H.R. REP. No. 
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1938). 
16. Bankruptcy Act of July I, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (amended 1938; repealed 1979). 
17. Creedon 8: Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez. Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391 
(1971). 
18. Thus rejection might only excuse the landlord's performance of affirmative executory 
obligations such as the provision of certain maintenance services. See Stell Mfg. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 372 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1966). 
19. Creedon 8: Zinman, supra note 17, at 1398. 
20. Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1932); American Brake Shoe 8: 
Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); Coy v. Title Guar. 8: Trust Co., 
198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912); In re Hays, Foster 8: Ward Co., 117 F. 879 (W.D. Ky. 1902). 
21. Creedon 8: Zinman, supra note 17, at 1399. 
22. See Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1932); American Brake Shoe 8: 
Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 278 F. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); In re Hays, Foster 8: Ward Co., 
117 F. 879 (W.D. Ky. 1902). 
23. Later in the same article, Creedon and Zinman did acknowledge that the presence 
of a prior mortgage alters the equities under a Chandler Act analysis: "[If] a lease [sic] is 
in a position where foreclosure of a superior mortgage would cut it off, there may be some 
merit to the argument that the lease should stand or fall with the mortgage." Creedon 8: 
Zinman, supra note 17, at 1430-31 n.l48. 
24. The two cases not discussed in the text, Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F.2d 969 (2d 
Cir. 1932), and American Brake Shoe 8: Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 278 F.2d 842 (S.D.N.Y. 
1922), both state in dicta the rule that the lessee of a bankrupt may not be put out of 
possession. But neither Vass nor American Brake Shoe dealt with or even referred to the 
rights of a lessee where there was a prior mortgage. 
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In one of the four cases, In re Hays, Foster b Ward Co . .,25 the court held 
that the landlord-tenant relationship is terminated when the tenant is ad-
judicated a bankrupt. The court noted that when the landlord is adjudicated 
a bankrupt, title to the real property devolves upon the trustee.26 The court 
emphasized that transferring title to the trustee would not alter the lessee's 
right to use the property. The court further asserted that change in ownership 
of real estate never affects the rights of the tenant.27 
While the tenant's rights may be unaffected, the tenant can be adversely 
affected by a change in ownership. For example, a change of ownership result-
ing from a mortgage foreclosure sale can extinguish the interest of a tenant 
who executed a lease subsequent to the mortgage.28 The change in ownership 
does not diminish the tenant's rights because the tenant has no rights su-
perior to the prior mortgagee in a foreclosure sale. The change in ownership, 
nonetheless, affects the tenant. Similarly, a bankruptcy court should not 
automatically protect the lessee's interest when the equities involved are no 
different from those in a mortgage foreclosure sale under state law. 
To protect the lessee's interest without regard to the interest of the prior 
mortgagee undermines established principles of real estate law. Indeed, a care-
ful reading of In re Hays suggests that the court did not maintain the debtor's 
lessee could never be dispossessed. Acknowledging that the Act authorized the 
trustee to sell the bankrupt's remainder interest in the land, the court cautioned 
such a sale does not require destroying the tenant's rights.29 Hence, the court 
did not mean the trustee cannot terminate the lease relationship. Rather, the 
court meant adjudication does not automatically mandate termination of the 
leasehold. 
Creedon and Zinman also cited Coy v. Title Guarantee b Trust Co.,80 
which involved a lessor for whom a receiver had been appointed.31 The Coy 
court upheld the receiver's rejection of a renewal option in a lease. In de-
termining whether the renewal would be burdensome to the estate, the court 
did not need to decide whether the receiver could dispossess the lessee. In fact, 
Coy contains language that contravenes Creedon and Zinman's argument. Al-
though the court acknowledged that a receiver may not impair a valid contract, 
it emphasized that a receiver is not bound by the covenants of leases or the 
lessor's executory contracts. The court further stated that a receiver may 
abandon or repudiate those covenants and contracts which would be unprofit-
able to adopt or perform.32 Thus Creedon and Zinman inappropriately relied 
25. 117 F. 879 (W.D. Ky.I902). 
26. I d. at 885. 
27. Id. at 884. 
28. See supra note I. 
29. II7 F. at 884. 
30. 198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912). 
31. Coy, like American Brake Shoe &: Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 278 F.2d 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1922), involved a pre-Chandler Act equity receivership and was therefore de-
cided by reference to nonstatutory general law. 
32. 198 F. at 280. It is unclear what standard is to be applied in rejecting an executory 
conttact under II U.S.C. § 365 (Supp. V 1981). Compare In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 
1979) (adopting the "business judgment" test) with NLRB v. Bildisco, 52 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. 
Feb. 22, 1984) (No. 82·818) (collective bargaining agreement was subject to stricter standard 
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on Coy, which broadly asserts a receiver's right to reject burdensome leases,33 
to support the proposition that a landlord's receiver cannot evict a tenant. 
The commentators' misplaced reliance stems from the focus of their in-
quiry. Precluding a bankrupt landlord from recasting the rent under existing 
leases is quite different from prohibiting a trustee's taking such action pur-
suant to his power to sell property of the estate free and clear of certain liens, 
claims, and interests. If the leased real property is subject to a prior mort-
gage,34 the equities require consideration of that mortgagee's rights. 
Those equities were examined in the Second Circuit's decision of In re 
Hotel Governor Clinton.35 The debtor owned the Hotel Governor Clinton 
and had leased space for a drug store to the appellants for a term of twenty 
years and nine and one-half months. The lower court found the mortgage 
on the premises exceeded the value of the land, buildings, and furnishings. 
The issue on appeal was whether the court had the power to terminate the 
lease. Although the lease was explicitly subordinate to the first mortgage lien,36 
the court did not support it& holding on the lease provisions. Rather the court 
declared that if a second mortgage could be wiped out in reorganization then 
so could a lease.37 The court reasoned that although a lease creates an estate in 
land, that estate is subject to prior mortgages and encumbrances . .Moreover, 
the court recognized that the tenant's leasehold interest constitutes a "claim." 
Under the Bankruptcy Act,38 a debtor's assets could be sold free from all 
claims of the debtor. Thus a tenant's claim, made by one claiming through 
the debtor, would be extinguishable in a reorganization.39 
than "business judgment" test, but reference to equities required a finding in favor of rejection). 
See generally 2 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, IT 365.03. 
33. The Coy court supported this assertion by citing language from United States 
Trust Co. v. Wabash Ry., 150 U.S. 287 (1893), which addressed the rights of a lessee's re-
ceiver: "The general ruie applicable to this class of cases is undisputed that an assignee or 
receiver is not bound to adopt the contracts, accept the leases, or otherwise step into the 
shoes of his assignor, if in his opinion it would be unprofitable or undesirable to do 
so .... " Id. at 299. Thus the Coy court, seeking to clarify the right of a lessor's receiver to 
reject contracts, relied on H'abash which dealt with the right of a lessee's receiver to reject 
contracts. By this analogy, the Coy opinion implies that a lessor's receiver has an unfettered 
right to reject a burdensome lease. 
34. See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("an 
appropriate adjustment of the rights of all creditors" may require rejection of a lease 
where a prior mortgagee is involved). 
35. 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Canter v. Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 142-49. 
37. 96 F.2d at 51. For a case in which junior mortgages were extinguished in a re-
organization plan, see In re 620 Church St. Bldg., 299 U.S. 24 (1936). 
38. Section 77B(h), 11 U.S.C. § 207(h) (repealed 1978) provided: 
[T]he property dealt with by the plan, when transferred and conveyed by the trustee 
or trustees to the debtor or the other corporation or corporations provided for by 
the plan, or, if no trustee has been appointed, when retained by the debtor pursuant 
to the plan or transferred by it to the other corporation or corporations provided for 
by the plan, shall be free and clear of all claims of the debtor, its stockholders and 
creditors, except such as may consistently with the provisions of the plan be reserved 
in the order confirming the plan or directing such transfer and conveyance or re-
tention .... 
39. 96 F.2d at 51. The court cited In re 620 Church St. Bldg., 299 U.S. 24 (1936), for the 
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The Chandler Act 
Section 70(b) of the Chandler Act authorized the trustee to reject unexpired 
leases, but not to deprive the lessee of his "estate."4° Case law construing 
section 70(b)41 has generally supported the pre-Chandler Act view of In re 
Hotel Governor Clinton that leases subordinated to a prior mortgage may be 
terminated.42 One of the earliest cases construing the section, In re Freeman/3 
involved a debtor who owned a residence encumbered by a mortgage and a 
long-term lease. The trustee arranged to sell the property for $750 above the 
outstanding mortgage. The buyer, however, would consummate the sale 
only if the debtor could deliver immediate possession. The tenant refused to 
cooperate. The court noted that the tenant's right of possession could pre-
clude a sale of the property for fair value.44 Analogizing lessees to vendees 
under installment sale contracts/5 the court advocated eviction when con-
tinuing the lease prevents an equitable arrangement with creditors. The 
court further noted that a tenant injured by the modification of his contract 
has a remedy because he is deemed a creditor.46 
Unfortunately for mortgagees, the Freeman opinion did not specifically 
base its holding on the existence of a prior mortgage.47 Nevertheless, Freeman's 
proposition that elimination of the lease under the provisions of § 77B did not render 
§ 77B unconstitutional. Church St. Bldg. held a reorganization plan that extinguishes claims 
having no value does not constitute deprivation of property in violation of the fifth amend-
ment due process clause. Id. at 27. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § llO(b) (1964). "Most of the commentators on the Bankruptcy Act have 
urged that the trustee should have no power to recast the rent. None of them seems to have 
considered the effect of that conclusion on the landlord's mortgagee whose mortgage is 
superior to the lease." Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 375 (footnote omitted). Krasnowiecki 
supports that proposition by citing to Creedon and Zinman, supra note 17. As noted, Creedon 
and Zinman did acknowledge in a footnote that the existence of a mortgage superior to 
the lease might affect the trustee's rights vis·a-vis the lessee. See supra note 23. 
41. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. 
42. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
43. 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943). 
44. Id. at 165. See also Creedon&: Zinman, supra note 17, at 1430-31 n.148. 
45. For treatment of installment sales contracts under the Code, see generally Epling, 
Treatment of Land Sales Contracts Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
55 (1982). The relevant Code provisions are 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(i) and (j) (Supp. V 1981). 
46. 49 F. Supp. at 165. 
47. Commentators have criticized the result of Freeman and have explained it away by 
reference to the prior mortgage. 
The court • • • overlooked the fact that there is nothing in the Act giving the 
trustee or debtor in possession the right to disaffirm an executed performance, and 
that the lessee has a vested estate that is distinct from the executory covenants con-
tained in the lease. The desire to effect a feasible plan of reorganization cannot over-
ride the vested rights of third persons who are not creditors of the debtor. Insofar 
as the lessee's leasehold is concerned he is as much a stranger to the reorganization 
case as one who purchased, received and paid for goods of the debtor prior to re-
organization • . • • The Freeman case, therefore, does not represent the proper view 
of the effect of rejection of an unexpired lease by the debtor-landlord. 
6 CoLLIER. ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 3.24[l.ltl (14th ed. 1969). Creedon and Zinman, supra note 17, at 
1431, agreed with Collier's analysis of Freeman. See also 2 CoLUER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 2, ~ 365.09 (updated but unchanged analysis of Freeman). 
HeinOnline -- 35 U. Fla. L. Rev. 662 1983
662 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW LVol.XXXV 
discussion of the equities between the debtor-landlord, mortgagee and tenant 
properly describes the conflicting interests. The court recognized that the 
evicted tenant would become an unsecured creditor of the bankrupt estate and 
would share in the assets realized upon selling the leased premises for an 
amount in excess of the outstanding mortgage. Focusing on the tenant's rights 
as a creditor, the court argued that a lessee cannot be permitted to wreck an 
equitable arrangement plan for all creditors carefully worked out in bank-
ruptcy court.48 
A more recent bankruptcy case considered the trustee's request to dissolve 
leasehold interests for the sake of the greater good. In the seminal case of 
In re Penn Central Transportation Co./9 the trustees proposed to disaffirm 
several leases of the bankrupt lessor where the rent was below the fair market 
rental at the time of the proceeding. The trustees argued that terminating the 
leases and renegotiating rentals for fair market value would increase the value 
of the debtor's estate.50 The court refused to disaffirm the leases because the 
mortgages were expressly subordinated to the leases. 5 1 In addition, the equities 
did not favor disaffirmance because the only party who could have dissolved 
the leases under common law, the mortgagee, was expressly subordinated to the 
lessees. 
The Penn Central opinion advances the thesis of this article because it 
suggests that a nonsubordinated prior mortgagee may not be prejudiced for 
the sake of preserving leasehold interests. Penn Central's analysis, however, was 
limited to the reorganization context. Arguably, the mortgagee's rights are 
Another commentator was less harsh in his analysis of Freeman: 
The Freeman decision was correct, but it does not stand for the broad proposition 
that the lessor provision is limited to straight bankruptcy. All that Freeman holds 
is that where (1) the lease is mbordinate to the mortgage, (2) the leasehold has little 
or no value and (3) the tenant presents no special equities, rejection is proper. Thus 
limited, Freeman is good law. 
Silverstein, Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankmptcy and Reorganization, 31 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 467, 497 (1964). 
48. 49 F. Supp. at 168. The court described the equities involved as follows: 
The equities also preponderate in favor of the removal of the tenant .... If injury 
is done that can be measured in dollars he becomes a creditor of the debtor and may 
assert his rights and share with other creditors of the same class in the arrangement 
proceedings. On the other hand, if he does not yield immediate possession of the 
premises, the debtor and his family are injured because they lose the small equity 
now but not later or otherwise realizable, above the mortgage on the home. And the 
creditors of the debtor, of whom there are twenty, and who are equally as innocent 
as the tenant insofar as the proceedings in bankruptcy are concerned, will also be 
injured. If this home were the only asset of the debtor, they might lose their debts 
entirely. They will certainly lose some substantial part of their debts if the property 
can not be sold at a price that will produce an excess over the mortgage. 
ld. at 167-68. 
49. 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
50. ld. at 1354. The Penn Central court assumed the trustees were correct in concluding 
that the rental paid by the lessees under the existing leases was less than current fair market 
rental for equivalent property. 
51. 458 F. Supp. at 1356 n.ll. 
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also due significant deference in liquidation. The Code's sale free and clear 
provisions may also support recognizing the mortgagee's rights in a liquidation 
proceeding. 
In a footnote, the Penn Central court referred to the then recently passed 
House version of the Bankruptcy Reform Act which contained a provision 
allowing a lessor to reject a lease but not to deprive the lessee of possession. 
The footnote stated that section 365(h) brings clarity to "an area of bank-
ruptcy practice sorely in need of clarification.''52 It has not. 
THE BANKRUPTCY REFoRM ACT oF 1978 
Two Code provisions directly affect the rights of a mortgagee whose 
mortgagor is a landlord subject to bankruptcy proceedings. Section 365(h) pur-
ports to clarify the pre-Code confusion regarding the proper construction of 
the lessee's "estate"63 by replacing vague terminology with more explicit 
language. The trustee's power to sell assets of the debtor's estate free and clear 
of all claims, subject to the interest of certain parties, is provided in section 
363(£)(1). This portion of the article will consider the language of those two 
sections, review the pertinent cases, and draw conclusions regarding their ap-
plication. 
Section 365(h): Lessee Possession Guaranteed 
Section 365(h)54 guarantees the lessee continued possession of the premises 
52. I d. at 1356 n.IO. 
53. See generally Creedon&: Zinman, supra note 17, at 1405-15, for a detailed discussion 
of the meaning of "estate" under § 70(b) of the Chandler Act. Creedon and Zinman explained 
the difficulty in defining the term "estate" as follows: 
A more difficult question than the meaning of "executory" in the rejection clause, is 
the meaning of "lessee's estate" in the saving clause in Section 70b. The problem faced 
by the drafters of the saving clause was in the dual character of a lease. The lease-
hold is a conveyance, carved out of the landlord's greater interest, leaving the land-
lord with a reversion after a term of years. • . • But a lease is often more than a 
conveyance and may contain executory contractual obligations requiring performance 
in the future by the bankrupt landlord. 
Id. at 1405-06. 
Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 370, acknowledged that although the Code "avoids some of 
the medieval learning that surrounds the concept of an 'estate,'" the Code is "hardly less 
obscure" on the question of whether the trustee in bankruptcy can recast the lessee's rent. 
54. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (Supp. V 1981) provides: 
(1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under 
which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the lease as 
terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession for the 
balance of the term of such lease and any renewal or extension of such term that is 
enforceable by such lessee under applicable non-bankruptcy law. 
(2) If such lessee remains in possession, such lessee may offset against the rent 
reserved under such lease for the balance of the term after the date of the rejection 
of such lease, and any such renewal or extension, any damages occurring after such 
date caused by the nonperformance of any obligation of the debtor after such date, 
but such lessee does not have any rights against the estate on account of any damages 
arising after such date from such rejection, other than such offset: 
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notwithstanding the landlord's bankruptcy. Moreover, subsection (h)(2) implies 
that the drafters did not intend to sanction modification of the rental rate.5;; 
Any arguments that might be invented to overcome this interpretation of 
section 36556 would do violence to the plain meaning of the provision. 
Mortgagees' counsel could argue, however, that the general rule of section 
365(h) is displaced by more particular considerations when the bankruptcy 
proceeding implicates the rights of a prior mortgagee. A recent case offers a 
unique situation in which to consider the ramifications of section 365(h). 
In In re LHD Realty Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Insumnce Co.}5' the 
mortgagee, Metropolitan, was also the lessee of the landlord-debtor, LHD. 
Metropolitan filed a complaint for relie£58 from the automatic stay59 and LHD 
At first impression, this language from the legislative history appears troublesome. "Thus, 
the tenant will not be deprived of his estate for the term for which he bargained." (emphasis 
supplied). H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE 
CoNe. & An. NEws 5963, 6306; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 60 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. i'\Ews 5787, 5846. However, the explanation of "estate" offered 
by In re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cantor v. 
Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938) clariftes any ambiguity: "A lease creates an estate in the land .. . 
but this is subject to prior mortgages and encumbrance," (citing In re Barnett, 12 F.2d 73, 
76 (2d Cir. 1926)). See also American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 278 F. 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1922) (describing matters of real property leases as pwperly "determined by 
[reference to] local law"). 
A recent decision has held a mortgagee taking possession of real property pursuant to a 
liquidating plan may not evict a lessee. Insofar as § 365(h) would preclude the trustee's dis-
possessing the lessee, the mortgagee transferee of the property would be similarly restrained. 
Solon Automated Serv., Inc. v. Georgetown, 22 Bankr. 312 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The court cited 
no authority whatsoever for its conclusion that § 365 "may not be circumvented by use of 
Chapter II proceedings." Id. at 315. 
55. The reference to "the rent reserved under such lease" indicates the drafters' focus. 
This reference indicates Congress only considered rent that is reserved. If the drafters did not 
intend to preclude modification of the rental rate it would have been sufficient to provide 
that the "lessee may offset the rent payable for the balance of the term ... any damages." 
56. Because the reference to rent reserved under such lease appears only in the pro· 
vision describing damages available to a lessee remaining in possession, the trustee could 
argue that the section circumvents but does not dispose of Lhe issue of rental modification. 
57. 20 Bankr. 717 (S.D. Ind. 1982). 
58. I d. at 718. 
59. II U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981), "Automatic stay,'' provides: 
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall 
grant relief from the stay provided under [11 U.S.C. § 362(a}], such as by terminating, 
annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property 
of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if-
(A) the debtor docs not have an equity in such property; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 
As the legislative history explained, the automatic stay is pervasive. 
Subsection (a) defines the scope of the automatic stay, by listing the acts that are stayed 
by the commencement of the case. The commencement or continuation, including the 
issuance of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could ha,•e been commenced before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case is stayed under paragraph (1). The scope of this paragraph is broad. 
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responded with a complaint to modify or set aside the mortgagee's lease.60 
LHD urged that the doctrine of commercial impracticability61 was available 
All proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license revocation, administrative, and 
judicial proceedings. Proceedings in this sense encompass civil actions as well, and all 
proceedings even if they are not before governmental tribunals. 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. 
News 5963, 6297; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE 
CoNe. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5836. Exceptions to the stay are listed at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (Supp. V 
1981). Certainly the foreclosure of a mortgage is precluded by the automatic stay and no 
exception applies. 
The Code's adequate protection provisions have received considerable attention. See, 
e.g., Gordanier, The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation: Adequate Protection for Se· 
cured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 299 (1980); Karlen, Adequate 
Protection Under the Bankruptcy Code, Its Role in Business Reorganization, 2 PACE L. REv. 
1 (1982). The mortgagee that is stayed from foreclosing its interest in the real property of the 
estate may ask that the stay be lifted because its property interest is not adequately pro-
tected. Collier explained the source of the Code's adequate protection rules: 
A point of disagreement under the Act was whether a stay could, in the sound 
discretion of the court, be continued in effect even where harm to the secured creditor 
was fairly obvious. It was possible to read the landmark Rock Island case [294 U.S. 648 
(1935)] as suggesting that stays and injunctions were always a matter of discretion 
given jurisdiction over the asset in question. The most extreme case was in In re Yale 
Express System, Inc. [384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967XJ where the court continued a stay in 
effect where harm appeared obvious on the theory that the secured creditor could be 
protected with a priority claim at the time of confirmation. The mandatory language 
of subsection (d) means that Yale Express has been overrnled insofar as an expense 
of administration does not constitute adequate protection. [S. REP. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5840] •••• 
No attempt has been made in the Code to define the term "adequate protection." 
However, examples are given in section 361 [11 U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981)] of what 
might constitute adequate protection and, at least in one instance, of what will not 
constitute adequate protection. 
2 CoLLIER. ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, ~ 362.07[1] (footnotes omitted). For a criticism of 
Yale Express see Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Re-
organization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAw. 15, 32-34 (1974). 
For cases considering the adequate protection requirement see In re C.F. Simonin's Sons, 
Inc., 28 Bankr. 707 (E.D.N.C. 1983); In re Schaller, 27 Bankr. 959 (W.D. Wise. 1983); In re 
Lewellyn, 27 Bankr. 481 (M.D. Pa. 1983); In re Adams, 27 Bankr. 582 (D. Del. 1983). 
Finally, it is unclear whether relief from the automatic stay is a prerequisite to fore-
closure of the mortgagee's interest within the bankruptcy court proceeding. See Nike, Inc. v. 
National Shoes, Inc., 18 Bankr. 507 (D. Me.), afl'd, sub nom. In re National Shoes, Inc., 20 
Bankr. 672 (1st Cir. 1982); In re East Redley Corp., 20 Bankr. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1982); United 
States v. Critical Fork Coal Corp., 18 Bankr. 422 (W.D. Va. 1982); Wes-Flo, Inc. v. Wilson 
Freight Co., 14 Bankr. 395 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Coleman Am. Cos. v. Littleton Nat'! Bank, 8 
Bankr. 384 (D. Kan. 1981). 
60. 20 Bankr. at 718. 
61. The concept of "commercial impracticability" is explained at U.C.C. § 2·615 (1978) 
("Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions"). The official comment to the section 
explains that the "section excuses a seller from timely delivery of goods contracted for, 
where his performance has become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen super-
vening circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contract-
ing." Id., comment I. While § 2-615 would of course not apply directly to a lease transaction, 
its terms may be applied by analogy. 
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as an alternative to the remedy provided by section 365.62 The court disagreed, 
finding the plain language of section 365 reflected the legislature's intent63 to 
make that section a debtor's exclusive remedy in executory lease situations.64 
The court then determined that rejection of the lease by LHD's trustee could 
not deprive the lessee of possession65 and acceptance by the trustee would not 
impart the power to modify the lease.66 The mortgagor was particularly inter-
For critical commentaries on the Code's commercial impracticability concept see Black, 
Sales Contracts and Impracticability in Changing World, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 247 (1981); Duesen-
berg, Exiting from Bad Bargains Via U.C.C. Section 2-615, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 32 (1980); Sirianni, 
Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: Part I, 14 U.C.C. L.J. 
30 (1981). 
62. Insofar as bankruptcy courts are courts of equity (see 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981)) 
it is not immediately clear why the court in LHD Realty Corp. was so reluctant to hear 
an argument premised upon equitable principles. 
63. 20 Bankr. at 719. 
64. Because 11 U.S.C. § 365 (Supp. V 1981) is captioned "Executory contracts and 
unexpired leases" it is no longer necessary to make the threshold determination of if 
and to what extent a particular lease is "executory." See In re O.P.M. Leasing Sens., Inc., 23 
Bankr. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), which recognized that unexpired leases were included within 
§ 365 to indicate an unexpired lease is an executory contract subject to rejection or as· 
sumption by a trustee in bankruptcy. 
65. It is clear that Congress' intent was to afford the debtor the benefit of rejecting an 
undesirable lease while at the same time protecting the property rights of the lessee 
[Citing H.R. No. 595, 95th Con{~·· 2d Sess. 349 (1977) reprinted in 1978 U.S. ConE CoNG. & 
An. NEws 5963, 6306; S.R. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S. ConE Cor-:G. & An. NEws 5787]. Thus, "rejection of the lease results merely in 
the cancellation of covenants requiring performance in the future (e.g., the providing 
of utilities, repair and maintenance, janitorial services, etc., which LHD maintains 
are burdensome) by the debtor; rejection does not terminate the lease completely so as 
to divest the lessee of his estate in the property." 
20 Bankr. at 719, citing 2 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, 1!365.09. The court also 
cited In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1978), and In re 1438 
Meridian Place, N.W., Inc., 11 Bankr. 353 (D.D.C. 1981). 
66. As an alternative to termination of the lease, LHD seeks to modify it. Section 
365 does not provide for modification of a lease after acceptance. . •. As stated in the 
Third Circuit [sic] In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir. 1981): 
"The trustee . . . may not blow hot and cold. If he accepts the contract, he accepts 
cum onere. If he receives the benefits, he must adopt the burden. He cannot accept 
one and reject the other." This general rule is applicable to the instant proceeding 
before this court. Acceptance of the lease does not allow its modification. 
20 Bankr. at 719. The COUrt also cited 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, 1!365.09, 
and In re Pin Oaks Apts., 7 Bankr. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Id. The crucial language from Pin 
Oaks provided: 
It would be dangerous precedent ... to be in the business of reforming contracts and 
leases because of changing economic conditions. Depending on the peaks and valleys 
of our economic circumstances, the courts would be considering in every case whether 
a contract was equitable or inequitable. In three years, ten years, the other party 
could return to court arguing that the contract required reformation again. The 
battle could continue during the entire life of the contract. It was not the intent of 
Congress for the courts to interfere so drastically in the commercial dealings of 
parties, negotiated in arms length transactions. 
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ested in modifying the existing lease because it gave Metropolitan the right 
to renew for five successive one-year periods at below-market rates.67 Metro-
politan had made clear its intent to renew at the stipulated rental rate. The 
court refused to permit the trustee to modify the lease notwithstanding the 
rather one-sided renewal agreement.68 
The court next considered Metropolitan's complaint for relief from the 
stay. Metropolitan sought the relief in order to foreclose the mortgage it held 
on the LHD premises. The property's potential value without the Metropoli-
tan lease was $240,000, while its value ·with the lease was $119,000.69 An 
examination of Metropolitan's and LHD's financial posture regarding the 
property convinced the court that relief from the stay should not be granted. 70 
The court remarked that the property's value was kept artificially low by 
Metropolitan's exercising its five-year renewal option. The court thus decided 
Metropolitan could not claim lack of adequate protection when Metropolitan 
itself caused the alleged lack of protection.71 
Whether mortgagee's counsel presented Metropolitan's best argument is 
questionable. Nevertheless, the court in LHD Realty Corp. considered the pro-
scription against the lessee's eviction to be absolute. The presence of the prior 
mortgagee did not affect the section 365 analysis because the mortgagee as 
lessee resisted the mortgagor-landlord's complaint to modify the lease. There-
fore, the decision does not expressly deny the trustee's right to modify a lease 
or to evict a tenant if the real property is encumbered by a mortgage prior to 
the lease. LHD Realty Corp. illustrates the mortgagee's predicament in bank-
ruptcy when the real property is encumbered by below-market leases. 
In re Pin Oaks Apts., 7 Bankr. 364, 372 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
67. The court acknowledged that "[t]he right of a lessee to exercise a renewal option 
has been upheld in the State of Michigan. 20 Bankr. at 719. See '{llso In re Mackie's 
Petition, 372 Mich. 104, 125 N.W .2d 482 (1963); Boden v. Trumpour, 344 Mich. 133, 73 
N.W.2d 462 (1955). 
68. 20 Bankr. at 720. See also In re Pin Oaks Apts., 7 Bankr. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (de-
scribing the difficulties of permitting modification of the rent renewed under a lease). 
69. The [subject real property] .•• has a potential value of approximately $240,000.00; 
this being the value of the property without the Metropolitan lease . • •• Due to the 
terms and effect of the lease, however, the current value is considerably lower. The 
rent provided for in the lease is insufficient to meet the operating costs and the amount 
needed for debt servicing .••• The effect on LHD is a negative cash flow of approxi-
mately $15,000.00 per year. 
[TJhe value of the property will increase by a minimum of $20,000.00 per year 
as each year of the lease expires. • • . The negative cash flow LHD is experiencing 
and will continue to experience is not severe enough to cancel out the $20,000.00 
yearly increase in the value of the property. 
20 Bankr. at 720·21. Because the anticipated appreciation rate ($20,000 per year) exceeded 
the annual negative cash flow ($15,000 per year} the court found that Metropolitan was "ade-
quately protected," See supra note 59, and refused to lift the stay. Id. 
70. 20 Bankr. at 720·21. 
71. I d. at 721. 
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Section 363(1Xl ): F1·ee and Clear Sale by Trustee 
Section 363(£)(1)72 of the Code permits the trustee73 to sell property of the 
estate free and clear of other claimsu if "applicable nonbankruptcy law" allows 
sale of that property free and clear of such interests.7 <; The applicable non-
bankruptcy law in this context is state mortgage foreclosure law.76 A review 
of state foreclosure actions is appropriate to indicate the extent to which 
bankruptcy courts will sanction the trustee's right to sell property free and clear 
of the lessee's interest. 
In re Hotel Governor Clinton,71 discussed previously, established the 
principle that a lease subordinate to a mortgage may be avoided by the trustee's 
sale free and clear of the lease. The more recent case of In 1·e Outrigger Club, 
72. 11 U.S.C. § 363(£)(1) (Supp. V 1981). 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1j 363.01 (3d ed. 
1981). 
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (Supp. V 1981) provides that a "debtor in possession" has all the 
powers and duties of a trustee. Therefore, reference in this article to the trustee refers also 
to a debtor in possession. 
74. The trustee may sell property under subsections (b) or (c) of section 363. 
Subsection (b) provides that the trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, 
sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(b) (Supp. V. 1981). Because a sale of real property of the debtor could not likely be 
"in the ordinary course of business," it is this subsection that the trustee would invoke if 
the mortgaged real property were to be sold free and clear. 
The Code does not supply a construction of the phrase "in the ordinary course of busi-
ness." Reference, then, may appropriately be made to an analogous provision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978). 
Subsection (c) applies to disposition of estate property by the trustee in the ordinary 
course of the debtor's business and, therefore, will not apply in the context under con-
sideration in this article. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (Supp. V 1981). 
75. The provision provides, in the disjunctive, the other circumstances that permit the 
trustee's sale of property of an entity other than the estate. The trustees may also sell such 
property if: 
(2) such [other] entity consents; 
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater 
than the aggregate value of such interests; 
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or 
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a 
money satisfaction of such interest. 
Id. The legislative history explained that a sale pursuant to subsection (f) "is subject 
to the adequate protection requirement. [II U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981), see supra note 
59]. Most often, adequate protection in connection with a sale free and clear of other inter-
ests will be to have those interests attach to the proceeds of the sale." S. REP. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978), ,·eprinted in U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEws 5963. The dispossessed 
lessee's claim, then, may attach to any surplus remaining after the prior mortgagee is paid 
in full. That result follows because the lessee's interest is defined by the nature of the 
lessee's "estate": a right to use of real property subject to the rights of a prior mortgagee. 
See discussion of In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Canter v. Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938), supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The 
"value" of the lessee's interest that is entitled to adequate protection is most appropriately 
determined by reference to the applicable state law. 
76. See supra note 1. 
77. 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Canter v. Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938). 
See supra text accompanying notes 35-39. 
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Inc.18 determined that Governor Clinton was still good law under the Chandler 
Act. In Outrigger Club the mortgagee sought an order evicting the debtor's 
tenants.79 The lessees opposed the plan of reorganization80 which provided 
for rejection of the lease. The tenants argued that a lease from a debtor to 
another could never be rejected under section 116(1) of the prior law.81 Citing 
Governor Clinton~ the court declared that tenants whose lease was expressly 
subordinated to the mortgage may be dispossessed. The court based its con-
clusion on the superior rights of the mortgagee rather than the trustee's power 
to reject executory contracts.82 
The result in the Outrigger Club case is laudable, but the opinion is most 
notable for its reliance on Governor Clinton despite claims that it was 
diminished in In re Minges.83 The Outrigger Club court correctly maintained 
that the Minges court did not recede from the essence of Governor Clinton· 
that a lease subordinate to an undersecured mortgage84 can be terminated in 
bankruptcy just as it could be in foreclosure.ss 
In Minges, the lessee appealed an order permitting the debtor-lessor's 
trustee to reject certain covenants in the leases.86 Each lease expressly provided 
that in the event of foreclosure the mortgagee would "not attempt to termin-
78. 9 Bankr. 152 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
79. The tenant, Al'ch Creek B &: G, resisted the application for eviction. The tenant's 
lease was executed after the debtor granted the mortgage interest. Id. at 153. 
80. The reorganization plan was structured pursuant to Chapter X of the Bankruptcy 
Act, "Corporate Reorganizations." 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (repealed 1979). 
81. Bankruptcy Act § 116(1), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (repealed 1979) provided: 
Upon the approval of a petition, the judge may, in addition to the jurisdiction, 
powers, and duties (hereinabove and elsewhere] in this chapter conferred and imposed 
upon him and the court-
(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, except contracts m 
the public authority, upon notice to the parties to such contracts and to such other 
parties in interest as the judge may designate. 
The lessees further contended that by the terms of the lease contracts the mortgagee 
agreed not to terminate the leases unless the tenants defaulted. The Outrigger Club court 
found that the mortgagees had never agreed to such terms. 
The court's analysis suggested an accurate understanding of the relationship between 
a mortgagee and the necessary subordination of a lease junior to the mortgage. 
The objectors rely on the fact that the lease in question contains a specific pro-
vision .•• precluding termination in the event of foreclosure. The mortgagees were 
not parties to the lease. It was, therefore, in clear contravention of the mortgage re-
striction against long term leases. The lease was junior to the perfected mortgage 
and, therefore, the lease provision in this instance is totally ineffective. 
9 Bankr. at 154. 
82. Id. at 153, citing In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Canter v. Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938). 
83. 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.I979). 
84. A lease that is subordinate to an undersecured mortgage is valueless. If a mortgage 
is undersecured, ab initio any claim junior to that mortgage interest will receive no proceeds 
from the sale of the mortgaged property. 
85. 9 Bankr. at 153. The court also concluded "a mortgagee in a bankruptcy liquidation 
plan retains a right it would certainly have in foreclosure." Id. at 154. 
86. 602 F.2d at 39. 
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ate this lease ... nor interfere with the rights of"87 the lessee provided the lessee 
was not in default. The mortgagee88 had initiated foreclosure proceedings in 
state court and obtained a judgment. The execution of the judgment was 
stayed by the debtor's filing a Chapter XII petition.89 Minges did not involve 
a mortgagee who sought the ouster of a subordinate lessee. Rather, the trustee 
petitioned the bankruptcy court for permission to reject certain portions ol 
the lease as "burdensome."9() On that basis Minges is readily distinguishable 
from Governor Clinton. 
The Minges opinion did consider an issue which has a direct bearing on the 
mortgagee's rights vis-a-vis a subsequent lessee: whether the court's decision 
to approve a trustee's rejection of an unexpired lease should be affected by 
considerations of which party would most benefit from the rejection. The 
court noted that the parties disagreed on whether benefit to the secured 
creditors is sufficient to justify rejection of the lease covenant. The court 
suggested rejection of the lease could be justified merely by finding that general 
creditors would benefit from the improved value of the property.91 
87. !d. at 40. 
88. ld. 
89. Real Property Arrangements By Person Other Than Corporations, Act of July I, 
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 as added June 22, 1938, ch. 575, §§ 401·526, 52 Stat. 916, (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1976) (repealed 1979)), "Chapter XII is an anomaly. It 
was designed to accommodate a unique situation in Chicago, Illinois. The justification for 
separate treatment of individuals during an extension or composition of secured and un-
secured debt was unsound then and now. Chapter XII is seldom used and no one favors its 
retention." Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Part I, 
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, Pt. I, 93d Gong., lst Sess. 240 (1973). 
Collier explained that shortly after the Bankruptcy Commission's Report: 
[T]he real estate market in the United States collapsed and the debtor's bar dis-
covered that a limited partnership filing for relief under Chapter XII could oust a 
state court receiver or mortgagee from possession of the debtor's property, could stay 
foreclosure, and could obtain confirmation of a plan of arrangement which provided 
for payment of the appraised value of the debtor's property. 
5 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J~ llOO.oi, .02 n.2 (15th ed. 1983), citing In re Pine Gate Assoc., 
2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1976) and In re Marietta Cobb, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
(CRR) 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
90. 11 U.S.C. § 813(1) (1976) (repealed 1979) provided: 
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, 
and duties [hereinabove and elsewhere in this chapter] conferred and imposed upon 
it-
(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the 
parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may designate. 
The Chapter XII trustee petitioned the court to allow the rejection of those lease agree-
ment portions: (i) requiring the landlord to provide utilities and janitorial service, (ii) grant-
ing the tenant right of first refusal on space in the building that became vacant, and (iii) 
allowing the tenant to renew the lease for five additional two-year periods. Minges, 602 F.2d 
at40. 
91. Minges, 602 F.2d at 44-. The second circuit remanded for further findings because the 
available record was inadequate to decide the issue. The remand demonstrates that the 
creditor should be prepared to document the benefits to the general creditors if the lessee·s 
interest is not favored over the interest of the mortgagee and general creditors. 
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Minges held open the possibility that a mortgagee may be in a better 
position in the bankruptcy context than in the state foreclosure situation.92 
The question reserved in Minges suggests the possibility of a court's being 
even more sympathetic to the mortgagee's rights than this article would 
urge. Nevertheless, the cases discussed in this section93 indicate that a mortgage 
having priority over a subordinate lease in a state foreclosure action is Iike-
·wise entitled to priority in a bankruptcy proceeding. These cases, however, 
failed to consider simultaneously the trustee's right to reject an unexpired 
lease and the concomitant right to sell property free and clear of certain 
interests. This explains the pre-Code confusion regarding a mortgagee's 
rights vis-a-vis a lessee of the debtor-mortgagor. 
The Application of Section 544(b ): 
Truste~s Avoidance Powers 
Section 544(b)94 of the Code provides that the trustee may avoid a debtor's 
obligation that would be voidable by an unsecured creditor under the ap-
plicable law.95 Professor Krasnowiecki interpreted this section as precluding 
the trustee's sale of mortgaged property for the benefit of the bankruptcy 
estate.90 Krasnowiecki argued that section 544(b) allows the trustee to assert 
only the rights of an unsecured creditor.97 The commentator did not formulate 
92. 602 F.2d at 44. Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion considered the balance of the 
equities. He found as a general rule "the trustee should not play favorites between the lessee 
and secured creditors by manipulating the obligations affecting them, absent some significant 
benefit to the creditors generally. To do so would be inequitable.'' Id. at 45 (Mansfield, J., 
concurring). 
93. See supra text accompanying notes 78-91. 
94. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. V 1981). 
95. Section 544(b) gives the trustee avoidance power for interests that are voidable by 
an unsecured creditor holding a claim that is allowable under § 502 or that is not allowable 
only under § 502(e). 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. V 1981) provides "[a] claim or interest, proof of 
which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, in-
cluding a creditor of a partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 
of this title, objects." 11 U.S.C. § 502(e) (Supp. V 1981) provides: 
(1) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section and paragraph {2) of 
this subsection, the court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of 
an entity that is liable with the debtor on, or has secured, the claim of a creditor, to 
the extent that-
(A) such creditor's claim against the estate is disallowed; 
{B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the time 
of allowance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution; or 
(C) such entity requests subrogation under section 509 of this title to the rights 
of such creditor. 
(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an entity that becomes 
fixed after the commencement of the case shall be determined, and shall be allowed 
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, disallowed under subsection (d) of this 
section, the same as if such claim had become fi:~Ced before the date of the filing 
of the petition. 
96. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 375 n.63: "Although the leases are not 'claims' it seems 
clear, by analogy, that the trustee c:itmot simply terminate the leases merely because the 
mortgagee would have this power." · 
97. Krasnowiecki, supra note 4, at 375 n.63 
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the proper application of section 544(b). The following review of the section's 
legislative history reveals the drafters' intent and delineates the scope of the 
section's language. 
In drafting section 544(b), the drafters seriously considered Professor 
Kennedy's comments on the prior law, section 70(e).98 Kennedy was concerned 
about the application of Moore v. Bay99 to the trustee's avoiding powers under 
section 70(e). While he did not seek a reinterpretation of Moore v. Bay,100 
Kennedy urged "that the anomalous doctrine ... not be extended.''101 The 
anomaly of the case was its distinct and seemingly inexplicable departure from 
established subrogation doctrine. Moore v. Bay provides that if a qualified 
creditor could avoid a transfer of the bankrupt's property, then the trustee's 
avoidance power is not limited by the amount of that creditor's claim.102 
Moore v. Bay contravenes the subrogation doctrine which allows a person sub-
rogated to obtain no greater rights than the person to whose position he is 
subrogated. 
To limit the consequences of Moore v. Bay, Kennedy argued that the 
trustee should not be permitted to assert the rights of a secured creditor with-
out regard to general subrogation law.103 The commentator was concerned that 
if the trustee could assert the rights of any available secured creditor without 
being limited by the amount of the secured creditor's claim, grave commercial 
consequences would result.104 Kennedy noted that even the most careful se-
cured "creditor could be frustrated by the trustee if the trustee could find a 
98. Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 11 U.S.C. § llO(c) (1976) (repealed 1979). 
99. 284 u.s. 4 (1931). 
100. "Moore v. Bay has survived well laid attacks on its illogicality as well as its in· 
equity, and this paper is not intended to renew them." (footnote omitted). Kennedy, The 
Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. 
L. REv. 1419, 1422 (1967). For defenses of the Moore v. Bay doctrine, see 2 G. GLENN, 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 866·67 (rev. ed. 1940); Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-
Should Its Rule Be Abolished?, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955); Comment, 17 ARK. L. REv. 46, 56 (1962); 
Comment, 45 YALE L.J. 504, 506 (1936). 
101. Kennedy, supra note 100, at 1422. 
102. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J70.95 (14th ed. 1978). 
103. Kennedy, supra note 100, at 1421, citing Scott, The Meaning of the Provisions for 
Recordation of a Tmnsfer as Applicable to Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act and a 
Critique of the Decision of the U11ited States Supreme Court in the Case of Moore v. Bay, 
18 VA. L. REv. 149,266 (1932). 
It should be acknowledged here that no one has been so bold as to argue cate-
gorically that the trustee should be able to assert the priority of the secured creditor 
having the topmost lien of any and every kind against the bankrupt's property. My 
point, hereinafter elaborated, i~ that if the trustee is allowed to assert the right of 
a lien creditor or any other variety of secured creditor to prevail over the rights of 
any other interest in property of a bankrupt estate without regard to the assumptions 
implicit in the preservation provisions and the law of subrogation generally, there is no 
basis in the Bankruptcy Act for distinguishing between the kinds of lien the trustee 
can use to his advantage. 
Kennedy, supra note 100, at 1424-25 n.20 (emphasis added). 
104. Id. at 1424. "[I]n fact, the result would be nothing less than a general avoidance of 
all junior liens and interests in banbuptcy." I d. (footnote omitted). 
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subsequent purchase-money security interest holder who took the precautions 
prescribed by [U.C.C.] section 9-312(3) or (4)."105 
The Reform Act drafters evidently agreed with Kennedy's concerns. In 
drafting section 544(b), they explicitly limited the trustee's avoidance powers 
under the Moore v. Bay doctrine to those the trustee could acquire from an 
existing unsecured creditor.106 The only remaining substantial application of 
section 544(b) is in the fraudulent conveyance context.107 Section 544(b) gives 
power to the trustee that supersedes the stricture of subrogation law. In con-
templation of the evils of fraudulent conveyances, such power may be justi-
fied. In fact, section 544(b) returns to creditors what would be theirs if the 
debtor were not bankrupt.1()8 
105. Id. at 1429 (footnote omitted). U.C.C. § 9-312(3) and (4) (1978) provide: 
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over 
a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable 
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if 
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of the inventory; and 
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder 
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing statement cover-
ing the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by the purchase 
money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the 
purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession 
(subsection (5} of Section 9-304); and 
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within 
five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and 
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to 
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describing 
such inventory by item or type. 
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has 
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if 
the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives 
possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter. 
For a discussion of the nice distinction between "avoidance" and "priority" see Kennedy, 
supra note 100, at 1429-30 n.40. 
106. "Subsection (b) is derived from current section 70(e). It gives the trustee the rights 
of actual unsecured creditors under applicable law to void transfers. It follows Moore v. Bay ••• 
and overrules those cases that hold section 70(e) gives the trustee the rights of secured 
creditors.'' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977), Teprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE 
CoNG. &: An. NEWS 5963, 6326; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1978), Teprinted in 1978 
U.S. CODE CONG. &: An. NEWS 5787, 5871. 
107. "In modem practice judicial liens are more scarce than hen's teeth and so absent 
from all but the rarest cases. For these reasons, section 544(b) (and 70(e) of the old law) have 
been shrunk to the size of pigmies by the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code." 
J. WHITE &: R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 1018 (2d ed. 1980). See Alces, The 
Efficacy of Guaranty ContTacts in Sophisticated Commercial Tmnsactions, 61 N.C.L. REv. 
655, 677 and n.143 (1983). 
108. The most widespread applications of § 544(b) are to set aside transfers of property 
of the debtor and obligations incurred by the debtor which are fraudulent as to 
general unsecured creditors under the laws of the particular states, and to set aside 
bulk sales transactions which fail to comply ·with the applicable Bulk Sales Acts, 
including specifically Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Although § 548 is 
modeled on the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 544(b) allows the trustee to 
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The Code's limitation of the Moore v. Bay doctrine does not mean the 
trustee may never take advantage of the rights of a secured party. Section 
544(b) merely limits the scope of the trustee's rights. It ensures that the 
trustee does not use the secured party's rights to exploit the expansive re-
covery sanctioned by Moore v. Bay. That is all that may be inferred from the 
Code's language. Professor Krasnowiecki attributed more to the section than 
the drafters intended. Section 544(b) should not be considered an impedi-
ment to the trustee's sale free and clear power pursuant to section 363(£)(1). 
SYNTHESIS 
Section 365(h) authorize~. the trustee of a landlord-debtor to reject an un-
expired lease provided the tenant is not dispossessed. That formulation is con-
sistent with prior law if no prior mortgagee is involved.109 Pre-Code authority 
indicates, however, that the formulation is inapposite when rights of a prior 
mortgagee are implicated. Before the Reform Act, courts devised two methods 
to safeguard the prior mortgagee's interest. Under the first method, bank-
ruptcy courts asserted that the existence of a prior mortgagee modifies the 
tenant's right to possession. 11° Courts also protected the prior mortgagee by 
focusing on the trustee's right to sell property free and clear of certain interests. 
This latter method assured t.he prior mortgagee the same protection available 
in a state foreclosure proceeding.111 If a foreclosing mortgagee joined the sub-
ordinate lessee in the foreclosure proceeding, the mortgagee could avoid that 
lessee's interest.112 
Section 365(h) should not. be interpreted to allow a lessee to avoid eviction 
merely because his landlord became the subject of a bankruptcy rather than 
a foreclosure proceeding. Indeed, it is doubtful whether the Code drafters 
would sanction such an anomalous result. The more cogent view is that 
take advantage of helpful peculiarities or longer limitation periods that may exist 
in some states. 
ILLINOIS !NST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL Eouc., BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY 
REFORM Acr OF 1978 7-20 (1980). 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 15-52, and In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 
1979) ("the weight of authority is that the conveyance aspect of a lease may not ordinarily be 
unilaterally disturbed by a debtor landlord or his trustee"). 
110. See In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943); In re Outrigger Club, Inc., 9 
Bankr. 152 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
Ill. See In re Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Canter v. Ramsey, 305 U.S. 613 (1938); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979). See also 
supra text accompanying notes 35-39 and 83-93. As stated by a Missouri court: 
There is no privity of either estate or contract between the mortgagee and the 
lessee of the mortgagor to bind either, and the foreclosure of the mortgage avoids the 
lease and releases the lessee from any obligation .... \Vhenever the estate which the 
lessor had at the time of malting the lease is defeated or determined, the lease is 
extinguished with it. 
Roosevelt Hotel Corp. v. Williams, 227 Mo. App. 1063, 56 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Ct. App. 1933). 
See also supra note 1 (describing the applicable real property law in this area). 
112. With regard to the necessity of joining the lessee in the state foreclosure action see 
supra note I. 
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sections 365(h) and 363(£)(1) must be considered in pari materia: the trustee's 
right to sell the mortgaged property free and clear of the lessee's interest may 
modify the right of the lessee to remain in possession. Under this interpreta-
tion, several arguments are available to the mortgagee involved in the bank-
ruptcy of its mortgagor. 
The Continued Efficacy of the "Absolute Priority" Rule 
The mortgagee whose mortgagor is the subject of a reorganization proceed-
ing may very well face a "cram down." When an "impaired"113 mortgagee 
opposes114 the reorganization plan,115 the court cannot confirm the plan unless 
the mortgagee's interests are protected. Section ll29(b)(l) allows confirmation 
of the plan if it does not "discriminate unfairly" and it is "fair and equit-
able."116 This section is labeled the "cram down" because it permits the court 
to force a plan on a dissenting class of creditors.111 
The legislative history of section 1129(b)(l) does not specifically address 
the mortgagee's rights in the situation considered here. The mortgagee, how-
ever, may argue that favoring a tenant over the prior mortgagee "discriminates 
unfairly" against the mortgagee and the general unsecured creditors.118 The 
113. The concept of impairment is explained at 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (Supp. V 1981). "The 
concept of when a class is 'impaired' ••• is vital. It is necessary to know whether a class 
that has not voted for acceptance of a plan is impaired or unimpaired under the plan. A 
class that is not impaired is deemed to have accepted the plan [11 U.S.C. § 1126(£) (Supp. V 
1981)]" (footnotes omitted). Klee, All You Ever Wanted .to Know About Cram Down Under 
the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979). 
114. A class that has not voted for acceptance of the plan and which is impaired is 
deemed a "dissenting" class. Klee, supra note 113, at 139. 
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (Supp. V 1981) provides for the classification of creditors' claims. A 
mortgagee's claim will be classified pursuant to subsection (a) which explains that "a plan 
may place a claim or an interest in a particular class only if such claini or interest is sub· 
stantially similar to the other claims or interests of such class." Given that formulation, the 
mortgagee will normally constitute a class of its own. Klee, supra note 113, at 150-51 
acknowledged that general rule except "when claims are secured by liens of equal rank, 
e.g., a bond issue secured by a single mortgage." 
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b}(l) (Supp. V 1981). This section contains the "cram down" rule. 
117. Klee, supra note 113, at 141 n.65, citing 124 CoNG. REc. Hll, 103-04 (daily ed . .Sept. 
28, 1978) and 124 CoNG. REc. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). 
118. The general creditors ••• will ••• benefit from the foreclosure when the pro-
ceeds exceed the amount of the mortgage debt. Such excess proceeds will go to the 
general bankruptcy estate and will be available for payment of the claims of general 
creditors. • • • [T]he trustee's use of the property free of the lease pursuant to a 
plan may produce income to pay debts other than the mortgage debt, thus allowing 
other creditors to benefit from the rejection of the lease as well. 
Siegel, Landlord's Bankruptcy: A. Proposal for TTeatment of the Lease by Reference to Its 
Component Elements, 54 B.U.L. REv. 903, 926-27 (1974). The commentator incorrectly cited 
In Te Hotel Governor Clinton, 96 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Canter v. Ramsey, 
205 U.S. 613 (1938) for the proposition that "a tenant's lease may be trea~ed as equivalent 
to a second mortgage in the leasehold property .••• Thus, the tenant may be accorded the 
status of a secured creditor.'' Siegel, supra, at 926 n.84. The Second Circuit did not equate a 
lessee with a second mortgagee in Governor Clinton but merely pointed out that if a second 
mortgagee's interest could be avoided by the first mortgagee in bankruptcy, certainly a lessee 
could expect no more preferential treatment. 96 F.2d at 51. 
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subsequent lessee who is given a windfall in bankruptcy is permitted to realize 
the full value of his bargain at the expense of a mortgagee under a cram down. 
As noted above, the tenant would have been dispossessed if not for the 
fortuity of the mortgagor's bankruptcy rather than foreclosure procedure.119 
Additionally, to preclude the mortgagee's fully realizing its claim prejudices 
the rights of all unsecured creditors by decreasing their pro rata share.120 
While the lessee in possession receives the complete benefit of his bargain, 
the general unsecured creditors and mortgagee must suffer the vicissitudes 
of what could be a protracted reorganization.121 
Even if this argument fails, the mortgagee is protected by the "fair and 
equitable" requirement in the cram down provision. The fair and equitable 
requirement with regard to a mortgagee includes122 satisfying one of three 
separate requisites. First, the plan may provide that the mortgagee retain a 
lien against the real property equal to the allowed amount of its claim. The 
mortgagee may receive deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed 
amount of its claim and having a present value equal to the value of the en· 
cumbered property.123 Second, the plan may be fair and equitable if it permits 
the sale free and clear of the mortgaged real property provided the mortgagee 
119. See supra note 1. 
120. An undersecured mortgagee forced to remain in the reorganization proceeding may 
choose not to make the election to treat its entire claim as secured under 11 U.S.C. § 11ll(b)(2) 
(Supp. V 1981) and may treat its claim as an allowed secured claim equal to the value of the 
collateral and "an allowed unsecured claim to the extent the collateral is less than the 
debt." Klee, supra note 113, at 1511-54. 
121. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code? (First Installmentj, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 122-26 (1983). 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (Supp. V 1981) provides that "'includes' and 'including' are not 
limiting." 
123. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41 (suggesting the proper construction of 
"value"). The Code distinguishes between a claim's amount and the value of the claim. 
For example, if a secured creditor is owed $1000 and the collateral securing repayment of the 
debt is only $500, the allowed amount of the creditor's claim is $1000 and the value of its 
claim is $500. So, for a plan to satisfy this first test the lien retained must secure the 
creditor's claim to the extent of ~.1000. The plan must also provide payments totaling $1000 
and having discounted value equal to $500, the present value of the collateral. See Klee, 
supra note 113, at 155. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. V 1981) explains that for a secured claim, the 
allowed amount of the claim will be less than the amount of the debt if the value of the 
collateral is less than the amoum of the debt. That result will, of course, not maintain if 
the creditor makes the § llll(b)(2) election. 
124. 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (Supp. V 1981) provides that the secured party may credit bid 
its claim: "At a sale ... of property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, if 
the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim against 
the purchase price of such property." The legislative history explained: 
The provision indicates that a secured creditor may bid in the full amount of the 
creditor's allowed claim, including the secured portion and any unsecured portion 
thereof in the event the creditor is undersecured, with respect to property that is 
subject to a lien that secures the allowed claim of the sale of the property. 
124 GONG. REc. Hll,903 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. 517,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 
1978). See also ILLINOIS INST. FoR CONTINUING LEGAL Eouc., ILLINOIS REAL EsrATE LITIGATION, 
VoL. II 4-10 to 4-11 (1981) (deS<:ribing the benefits of a sale of real property within the 
bankruptcy proceeding). 
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may credit bid124 its claim and the lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale.125 
A third equitable resolution is to give the mortgagee the "indubitable equiva-
lent" of its allowed claim. 
The first alternative does nothing for the mortgagee whose collateral is 
encumbered by below-market leases. It simply surrenders to the unfortunate 
analysis of Professor Krasnowiecki. In contrast, the sale free and clear alterna-
tive is certainly fair and equitable. Under that alternative, the pro rata shares 
of general unsecured parties will not be diluted by the mortgagee. In fact, any 
surplus from the sale free and clear would offset the additional unsecured 
claim of the dispossessed lessee. Thus a mortgagee should argue that sale free 
and clear is the only way to assure the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim. 
Before the trustee will propose such a plan, however, some advantage to the 
debtor must be shown.126 
The mortgagee's most persuasive argument centers upon the application 
of the absolute priority rule to the fair and equitable test in cram down.127 
Under the absolute priority rule, a class must be provided for in full before 
any junior class may participate.128 Because the Code nowhere displaces the 
absolute priority rule,129 the mortgagee may argue that to favor the lessee by 
125. See Klee, supra note 113, at 155. 
126. See supra note 69, discussing the court's valuation analysis in In re LHD Realty 
Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 20 Bankr. 717 (S.D. Ind. 1982). The case illustrated how 
the depressive effect of a below-market lease should bear a relationship to the amount of 
the unsecured claim that the dispossessed lessee may assert. Additionally, by satisfying the 
mortgagee's claim the trustee will have found a means to trade a secured claim (that of the 
mortgagee) for an unsecured claim (that of the dispossessed lessee). A review of the fair 
and equitable requirement described in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981) with regard 
to unsecured claims confirms that unsecured claims are more easily dealt with in the re-
organization plan than are secured claims. A plan is deemed fair and equitable with regard 
to unsecured creditors if "the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of 
such class will not receive or retain on account of such junior daim or interest any property." 
I d. 
127. One commentator, writing with regard to the prior law, came close to recognizing 
the impact of the absolute priority rule on a mortgagee involved in the bankruptcy of its 
mortgagor: 
[I]f the mortgage is superior to the lease and if the plan of arrangement requires the 
mortgage creditor to accept an extension, reduction or diminution of security, to 
accord the lessee the same rights as in straight bankruptcy [i.e., liquidation] would 
be to prefer him over the mortgagee. Any impairment of the rights of the mortgagee 
enhances the value of the subordinate leasehold. 
Silverstein, supra note 47, at 495. The commentator did not explore the possibility of a 
sale free and clear of the lease within the reorganization proceeding. 
128. Klee, supra note 113, at 143 n.81, citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 
308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913). See also In re Penn 
Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1978): 
[R]ejection of a lease in a plan of reorganization .•• may be necessary to an appropri-
ate adjustment of the rights of all creditors, in application of the absolute priority 
rule. That is, the absolute priority rule would be violated if the lessee's right re· 
mained untouched, while the rights of a senior mortgagee secured by the leased 
property were adversely affected in various ways. 
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precluding disturbance of tile lessee's possession violates class priorities. The 
mortgagee could again argue that only a sale free and clear of the mortgaged 
real property is consistent with the absolute priority rule. 
The Fifth Amendment as Either Imperative or Policy 
Section 361 of the Code illustrates the type of "adequate protection" to 
which secured parties are entitled when restrained from foreclosing their 
interests.130 The following portion of the section's legislative history indicates 
the constitutional and policy grounds of adequate protection: 
The concept [of adequate protection] is derived from the fifth amend-
ment protection of property interests .... It is not intended to be con-
fined strictly to the constitutional protection required, however. The 
section, and the concept of adequate protection, is [sic] based as much 
on policy grounds as on constitutional grounds. Secw·ed creditors should 
not be deprived of the benefit of their bargain . ... Though the creditor 
might not receive his bargain in kind, the purpose of this section is to 
insure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially what he 
bargained for.131 
Under the adequate protection concept, a mortgagee may argue that the 
bankruptcy court's disposition of the subject property should not impair the 
value of the mortgage interest. Even those who would question the applica-
tion of fifth amendment protections to secured creditors' interests must recog-
nize that the Code's adequate protection requirements focus on the concept 
of value. 
In a recent article/32 Professor Rogers maintained that the protection 
afforded secured creditors is constitutionally mandated by the fifth amend-
ment.133 Professor Rogers acknowledged, however, that "the adequate pro-
tection provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code require only that the secured 
129. The rule is, however, relaxed in the context of unsecured claims and ownership 
interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) & (C) (Supp. V 1981). 
130. See supra note 59. 
131. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Gong., 1st Sess. 338-339 (1977), reprinted in l:.S. CODE 
CoNG. & Ao. NEws 5963, 6295, citing Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 
(1940); Louisville Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). Justice Brandeis, writing 
for the court in Radford explained. "the bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive 
powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment." 295 U.S. at 589 (footnote omitted). 
132. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study 
of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 973 (1983). 
133. Professor Rogers described his unconstitutional impairment thesis in these terms: 
The theory that the fifth amendment placed substantive limits on the ability of the 
government to restrain secured creditors' rights in reorganization has crystallized into 
the following proposition: any impairment of the liquidation value of a secured 
creditor's collateral attributable to the exercise of powers conferred on the reorganiza-
tion court by bankruptcy legislation is, in the absence of just compensation, a viola-
tion of the takings clause of the fifth amendment. 
Rogers, supra note 132, at 977, citing In re American Kitchen Foods, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 
715 (D. Me. 1976). 
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creditor be protected against any decrease in the value of his interest in the 
collateral!'134 The commentator argued that the secured creditor's overall 
economic position is not protected even if the value of his interest is main-
tained. For example, the value of the collateral may not be sufficient to cover 
interest accruing on the debt after the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.135 
Protecting merely the value of the collateral offers the mortgagee restitution or 
reliance protection rather than giving him the benefit of his bargain or ex-
pectation protection.136 If the fifth amendment is read to protect not only the 
value of the mortgagee's interest but also the benefit of his bargain, the Code's 
adequate protection provision fails.137 A mortgagee that urges the court to 
permit sale of the collateral free and clear of the lessee's interest is asking only 
for that which the fifth amendment and Code policy clearly guarantee-restitu-
tion. 
To support the argument that the lessee's interest should be avoidable by 
the sale free and clear mechanism, the mortgagee may argue that protection 
of restitution interests requires protection of at least the unencumbered 
market value of the collateral. The court must not itself impair the value of 
the collateral by permitting a lessee to prevail over the prior mortgagee.138 A 
court should honor the mortgagee's request to sell the collateral free and 
clear of the lessee's interest if such a sale is the only way to protect the value 
of the collateral. If the property is not sold, the mortgagee may argue that 
the value entitled to adequate protection is the value of the mortgaged 
property unencumbered by subordinate below-market leases. Because the 
Code does not define "value,"139 a mortgagee may urge the foregoing analysis 
134. Rogers, supra note 132, at 996. See also O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Post-
petition Interest in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251 (1982) (considering the 
issue of adequate protection of postpetition interest). 
135. Only secured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest under the Code. See 11 
U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. V 1981). The typical mortgage, deed of trust, or loan and security 
agreement will have a sufficiently broad definition of the "liabilities" secured to pick up 
most imaginable fees, costs, and charges. 
136. See J. CALAMARI &: J. PERILLO, CoNIRAcrs § 14-4 (2d ed. 1977): "The [restitution 
interest] represents [the contracting party's] interests in the benefits be bas conferred upon 
the other. The reliance interest represents the detriment he may have incurred by changing 
his position. The expectation interest represents the prospect of gain from the contract." 
137. See Rogers, supra note 132, at 997. 
138. See In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1978), dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
139. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. V 1981) provides that the "value [of a secured party's 
interest] shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed 
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any bearing on such disposition 
or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." See Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 1I 
of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441 (1984). Addressing the 
value issue with regard to 11 U.S.C. § 361 "adequate protection" the legislative history ex-
plained: 
The section does not specify bow value is to be determined, nor does it specify 'vhen 
it is to be determined. These matters are left to case-by-case interpretation and 
development. It is expected that the courts will apply the concept in light of the 
facts of each case and general equitable principles. It is not intended that the courts 
will develop a bard and fast rule that will apply in every case. The time and method 
of valuation is not specified precisely, in order to avoid that result. There are an 
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in any Code context where its rights are determined by reference to the value 
of the collateral. For examp.!e, this analysis may apply to the Code provisions 
describing the rights of a secured creditor seeking relief from an automatic 
stay.140 In seeking relief, the mortgagee may argue that adequate protection 
requires the collateral's value to be measured by the market value of the real 
property unencumbered by the below-market leases. Likewise, the value of the 
mortgagee's secured claim for purposes of protection in the reorganization 
plan should be the property's unencumbered market value.H1 The drafters' 
intent is vindicated only if that analysis is adopted. To do otherwise gives effect 
to Professor Krasnowiecki's formulation and undermines an equitable re-
organization. Indeed, if Krasnowiecki's fears are realized, potential mortgagors 
may have to pay a premium reflecting the risk assumed by a mortgagee whose 
mortgagor may become a bankrupt landlord. 
Section 510 and Principles of Equitable Sub01·dination 
Section 510 describes instances in which a bankruptcy court may sub-
ordinate one claim, that of the lessee, to another, a prior mortgagee. Subsection 
(a) permits enforcement of a subordination agreement to the same extent 
such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Sub-
section (c) allows a bankruptcy court to apply principles of equitable sub-
rogation.142 The section provides a mortgagee with two more persuasive argu-
ments. First, by leasing subsequent to the recordation of a mortgage on the 
property, the lessee has effectively agreed to subordinate its claim to the 
mortgage. Such is the effect of state real property law, thus the lessee may not 
argue he detrimentally relieu on the right to possession described in section 
365. To eliminate any ambiguities, the mortgage instrument should provide 
that each subsequent lessee execute a subordination agreement.143 
infinite number of variations possible in dealings between debtors and creditors, the 
law is continually developing, and new ideas are continually being implemented in 
this field. The flexibility is important to permit the courts to adapt to varying circum-
stances and changing modes of financing. 
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Se>-S. 54, reprinted in U.S. Coo£ CoNG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5840. 
140. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981). 
141. See supra note 123; see also ll U.S.C. § 506 (Supp. V 1981) (discussing the determina-
tion or secured status). 
142. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (Supp. V 1981). 
143. An argument by analogy may be framed by reference to the U.C.C. § 2-207 ("battle 
of the forms") analysis suggested in ]. ·wHITE & R. SuMMERS, UNIFORM Co~IMERC.IAL CODE 
§ 1-2 (2d ed. 1980). Professor Summers examined whether a warranty disclaimer found in 
an acceptance form but not found in the offer form may become one of the terms of the 
integrated contract between the parties. He suggested that consideration of those provisions 
that the Uniform Commercial Code would supply as a "gap filler" is appropriate. 
Summers insists on the relevance of an alternative analysis for those cases in 
which the express term in the [acceptance] conflicts with a term supplied by a Code 
gap filler provision. Thus if on the facts [of the particular case] an implied warranty 
would arise, the disclaimer in the offeree's subsequent form would become a different 
(not additional) term and would not enter the contract under 2-207(1) and 2-207(2). 
Id. A thorough consideration of the parameters of such an argument by analogy is beyond 
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Because the Code does not define "subordination agreement," a bank-
ruptcy court could infer one from the position of the parties. Provided the 
mortgage was properly recorded, the lessee would be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the mortgagee's claim at the time the lease was executed.144 
As a court of equity, the bankruptcy court should give effect to the relative 
priority of the mortgagee and lessee as such parties viewed their relationship 
before the bankruptcy proceeding.145 Substantial authority exists to support 
a bankruptcy court's finding subordination by implication.14G This argument 
merely asks the bankruptcy court to impute the consensual subordination that 
would obtain in any event by operation of state law.l47 
Alternatively, the mortgagee may make a more traditional equitable sub-
ordination argument and find support in the applicable legislative history. 
The drafters clearly intended that principles of equitable subordination follow 
existing case law.148 The drafters observed that courts generally subordinate 
claims only when the claim is susceptible to subordination or when the 
holder of the claim has acted inequitably.149 Such case law suggests a lease 
may be subordinated without a showing of the lessee's inequitable conduct. 
Thus a mortgagee may argue that the bankruptcy court is not precluded 
from subordinating the lessee's claim merely because the lessee has acted 
scrupulously. 
CONCLUSION 
A mortgagee whose collateral is subsequently encumbered by the 
mortgagor's below-market leases may be able to avoid the lessee's interests in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act seems to 
guarantee the lessee's right to continued possession of the mortgaged real 
property. The arguments suggested here, however, assert that a tenant's rights 
should not frustrate the reasonable commercial expectations of the mortgagee. 
When properly considered, the most cogent legal reasoning and venerable 
principles of equity vindicate the mortgagee's priority and mandate ejection 
or renegotiation of the rent of below-market tenants. 
the scope of this article. It is sensible, however, to resolve difficult questions arising under 
the Bankruptcy Code by reference to generally accepted principles of commercial law. 
Therefore, the logic of the Summers § 2-207 analysis may impress a bankruptcy court, al-
though no system of gap fillers exists for real property leases. 
144. It is impossible to state a general rule about the position under various recording 
acts of a lessee who leases property without notice of a prior mortgage. At least one court 
has held a lessee is a "purchaser" for purposes of a recording act but is protected only to 
the extent of the amount of rent paid before he has notice. Egbert v. Duck, 239 Iowa 646, 
32 N.W.2d 404 (1948). 
145. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 
U.S. 524 (1900). See also Herzog 8.: Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bank-
ruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 83, 84 (1961), citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
146. See Herzog 8.: Zweibel, supra note 145, at 91, citing Prudence Realization Corp. v. 
Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942); In re George C. Bruns Co., 256 F. 840 (7th Cir. 1919). 
147. See supra note I. 
148. 124 CoNe. R.Ec. Hll,095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CoNe. REc. 517,412 (daily ed. 
Oct. 6, 1978) (emphasis added). 
149. Id. 
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This article does not suggest that the Code sanctions a trustee's recasting 
the rent reserved in a lease between the debtor-landlord and tenant. It is 
nonetheless reasonable to conclude that a lessee faced with the prospect of 
eviction may be willing to renegotiate the lease. The arguments offered here 
should prepare the mortgagee or trustee for such negotiations. In any event, 
if this article promotes consideration of new means to effect the most equit-
able results, it has served its intended purpose. 
